Christchurch, a Man Made Disaster?

In April this year, I was member of a group from UoN, looking at the impact on and recovery from the disasters of 2010 and 2011 that impacted Christchurch, New Zealand.

My interest was why a modern vibrant almost sister city, could be unexpectedly laid flat by a series of earthquakes, and how it handled the post-disaster recovery and reconstruction.

On the first morning, I stopped in my tracks outside my hotel viewing the desolate scene, my previous experience with hazards had been on TV.   I did feel numbed wondering what happened to the people who had worked in the invisible buildings.   They would still have their families, mortgages, ideals and aspirations but no workplace.

And that was my first handshake with Christchurch!   The people of Christchurch we met did not complain about losing their jobs, they did comment about: no community consultation; the Red Zone; the stressful insurance negotiations, and the inadequate settlements; the escalating cost of rebuilding, (where is a builder when you want one).

Christchurch had found “the eternal elixir of job creation”, it was called “post disaster building boom”.   It also unfortunately found “upper middle class poverty”.   Family, mid early forty’s; kids at Uni; good jobs; manageable debt, ---The DISASTER --- house deemed unsafe; alternative accommodation; office demolished, got job???; home site acquired unilaterally; home insurance under half expectations, takes 4 years; depression; anger; hopelessness; no assets; bank wants its money, takes insurance and government money; kids university fees???; divorce expensive; admittance to mental health facility.   The Newspapers continued to publish wellbeing surveys (the traumatised are the surveyed), all is well, Christchurch is rebounding.   Which is the truth?

Sorry for that side-track into Christchurch’s real world.   Back to our itinerary, the Anglican Cathedral, its carcass lies in the heart of Christchurch, having been struck a solid blow by the 2010 hazard, suffering a more severe blow through the bishop of Christchurch initiating and then staying demolition early in 2011, in the intervening years suffering an almost fatal blow by dereliction.   Whilst the bishop wants to pull this grand historic building down, the community and the government are fighting her decision in the courts.   Lets all hope that she is vanquished.

We then visited the beautiful Christchurch Art Gallery, reopened in December 2015 after a NZ $ 58 millions refit, including the implementation of a base loading mitigation facility.   A mitigation strategy against the impact of horizontal acceleration during an earthquake.   Unfortunately, it did not address the vertical acceleration that also impacts Christchurch during earthquakes.   Does that mean that the art gallery is half resilient?

Onward to The Exchange (EXCH), a great example of resiliency evolving from a community drop-in centre, a pleasure to visit and to experience such a successful resiliency program in action.

Then to Cultivate Urban Farm, ‘a saint in sheep’s clothing’, offering a sustainability program selling herbs and vegetables to local restaurants and collecting their green waste.   Its real objective, being to nurture and make better troubled youth by engendering self worth whilst they are employed in the gardens.   The unusual method of achieving this goal is to treat their charges as peers, with dignity, respect and purpose, strange isn’t it!

Onward to Resilient Organisations, an enterprise established on the extensive research by academics at Christchurch University into resiliency.   The resiliency referred to, being the resiliency of businesses to survive systemic hazards, a completely different definition of resiliency then we would use in the DRR context, but essential for sustainability.

Then The Lyttelton Project, a community organised and supported project with sustainability the driver of each individual program, we experienced their Saturday farmers market, our support and enthusiasm well demonstrated by the extra kilos we carried back to the bus (and not in carry bags).

Enter the Twilight Zone, in Christchurch called the Red Zone, I had never been in a ghost town, where there were no houses, or any other indication other than the drives across the footpath, that there were once over 8,000 homes in what was a major liquefaction area of Christchurch.   Everyone was somewhat suppressed after our stroll through “nowhere”, Christchurch.

A quick walk around the city area, showed construction, and also the lack of construction.   After six years I thought Christchurch would be a mini Dubai, with cranes everywhere.

My observations 

Was Christchurch a disaster waiting to happen, has it stopped: pre-disaster, irrefutable advice that mitigation was required was ignored; post-disaster, it ignored the community and their reconstruction, another disaster?   A man-made disaster?

Hazards: unpredictable in occurrence and scope; indiscriminate in the social structures they impact; do not adhere to their human assessed “return” periods; leave devastation in their wake; but they do not cause disasters.  

Humans: predictable in their pursuit of profit and self-interest; discriminate towards those who are vulnerable; respond rapidly after a hazard; leave confusion and desolation in their wake; and they do cause disasters.

Special Issue "The L'Aquila earthquake ten years on (2009-2019): impacts and state-of-the-art"

Dears,

I am very happy to share with you this call for paper for the Special issue "The L'Aquila earthquake ten years on (2009-2019): impacts and state-of-the-art", which will be edited by me, Giuseppe Forino (University of Newcastle, Australia, g.forino@gmail.com), together with Fabio Carnelli (University of Milan-Bicocca, Italy, fa.carnelli@gmail.com), and will be published on the journal Disaster Prevention and Management in December 2018.

Please feel free to contact us in case of interest and to distribute the call among your networks and peers.

Here the call for paper (also available on the journal website)

Introduction

Due to the recent occurrence of disruptive earthquakes in Italy (Emilia, 2012; Central Italy, 2016 and 2017) following the L’Aquila earthquake in 2009, both disaster scholars and social scientists (sociology, anthropology, geography) communities show a growing interest in understanding the medium and long term impacts of such earthquake and the related controversial recovery. Furthermore, in both national and international journals there is a growing interest on issues related to other Italian earthquakes. Nevertheless, while a number of publications exists about the short-term impacts of the earthquake in L’Aquila, evidences are still necessary for providing a clear understanding of the long terms impacts by the recovery and reconstruction management on local communities, their everyday life, and their surrounding environment. 

Accordingly, this special issue aims to add to the existing body of knowledge on the L’Aquila earthquake a socially-centred perspective able to investigate issues broadly related to impacts on, and response by, the socio-cultural systems and its functioning. Theoretical and methodological findings for disaster research are also welcome. The call aims to collect perspectives from, but not limited to, disaster studies, geography, anthropology, sociology, political ecology, environmental history, and urban studies.

Submissions on topics relating but not limited to;

Long-term reconstruction impacts

Politics and policy in disaster recovery

Political ecology of recovery

Culture, local knowledge and recovery

Social Vulnerability

Disaster governance

Emergency/recovery and socio-psychological aspects

Land-use and land-use conflicts

Space, place, and urban planning

Community and urban resilience

Social/spatial/environmental justice

Risk communication

Housing studies and political economy

Social movements and recovery

Folklore studies, religion and recovery

Methodological and epistemological issues in disaster research

Deadlines

Submission deadline; 31st December 2017

Expected Publication Date: December 2018

Submission Information

Special Issue submissions should be made through ScholarOne Manuscripts, the online submission and peer review system. Registration and access is available at http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/dpm.

What’s new in Italy? Some notes on this October seismic swarm

Before starting: 

While I was writing today this piece about the Italian earthquake on 26th October, a new earthquake occurred in the same areas (Preci, Norcia, Ussita, Arquata del Tronto). Much information is yet to be confirmed. Some important pieces of cultural heritage, such as the Basilica of San Benedetto in Norcia, have collapsed. Places affected by the previous earthquakes in August and few days ago have been hit as well. The magnitude has to be confirmed at 6.5-6.6. It seems that some villages are isolated and at least three people have been rescued under collapsed buildings. No reported victims. All to be confirmed and updated in the next hours.

The seismic swarm on 26th October

A seismic swarm occurred on the 26^th October in the Valnerina area (Umbria region) and in part of the Macerata province (Marche region). The list of affected places is long, including: Visso, Ussita, Camerino, Cingoli, Matelica, Norcia, San Severino Marche, Tolentino, Castelsantangelo sul Nera. These areas are just a few kilometres far away from Amatrice, Accumoli and Arquata del Tronto, hit on 24^th August by an earthquake which caused 291 deaths, hundreds of injured and thousands of evacuees. The environment is similar: settlements with centuries (in some cases one millennium) of history placed on, or perched upon, hills and mountains in the astonishing landscapes of Central Apennines. The social structure is similar, with villages usually host to a few hundred inhabitants with an elderly demography. The loss of centuries of settlements, history, cultural heritage, and human-environment relationships represents again an unfathomable loss for Italy and the world.

The collapsed Basilica of San Benedetto, Norcia, this morning. Source: Twitter

While damage has been severe, there was just one reported victim (a 73 years old man due to heart attack); few were severely injured, and rescues from collapsed buildings were not necessary. This appears to be because when the first quake of 5.4M occurred, people that were already worried after the earthquake in August were able to evacuate to safer areas, so they were safe when the strongest swarm of 5.9M occurred. The earthquake was felt in Rome, where people left their houses going into the streets; in L’Aquila, which is still recovering (and will do for decades) from the earthquake in 2009; as well as in Amatrice and closer areas, where other buildings collapsed. Approximately 4000 people have evacuated, in addition to the other 3500 evacuees after the earthquake on 24^th August.

It would appear that the destruction of settlements is a sufficient, but not necessary condition, to draw attention by politics, media and general audience (but I have to admit, also by scholars). The smell of victims’ blood is necessary, together with the dust on the face of rescuers awake for 48 hours (better if helped by some rescuers dogs) in order to bring politicians in the affected areas doing portraits of themselves while hugging affected people, or press and television doing interviews or filming ruins, better with a heartbreaking soundtrack on the background. Easily touching our intimate nature as voyeurs, these kind of story are something widely and rapidly shared. Conversely, a part of two initial and “emotional” days, politics, media, and press very poorly covered this October event. Being not at a catastrophic level, it can therefore be declassified as a routine into Italian life and institutions. However, this earthquake is important like any other Italian earthquake. It serves to confirm the usual trends, to reject common and established narratives given, and to add hidden perspectives which are now urgent, as very briefly presented below.

A damaged building in Visso (Macerata province), 26th October 2016. Source: RT

Confirming the perennial emergency

When a disaster happens (flood or earthquake, does not matter) in Italy, we should always wonder what has been done in the past. For example, it is acknowledged that these areas have a great exposure to seismic hazards. Seismologists recognized that seismic faults are very active in these months, so preparedness is an important phase to be understood. Therefore, efforts should have been done immediately at least for improving preparedness among communities and institutions, for updating and sharing (when present) emergency plans, for assessing their usefulness, for improving the collaboration between City Councils and communities and between different levels of government. For the longer term, critical conditions in terms of buildings and slope stability (there have been some landslides) should have been monitored, assessed, and solutions implemented. However, it seems we live in a perennial emergency, whether an earthquake, a flood, or an induced “waste crisis”. Discussions start just after an emergency, Twitter becomes inundated of hashtags, the news occupy pages of media and of political talks for two weeks, the “state of emergency” is proclaimed for years deviating from normal administrative and transparent operations; then, all sink into oblivion until the next tragedy. Great part of politics and media stopped talking about Amatrice and other areas after three weeks, leaving those places alone and the affected communities with lasting physical and social disruption.

New bottles, old wine: confirming same problems

When an earthquake happens in Italy, the immediate reaction is to point the finger to the protection of cultural heritage. In my previous intervention on this blog after the earthquake in August, I tried to explain why reducing seismic risk is not just a question of safeguarding cultural heritage, but recalls questions of political commitment, risk perception, necessity of clearer focus by institutions, collaboration with local communities, and improvement of the everyday life of these places with jobs, basic and public services, transport, environmental protection. In this way, it is time to draw attention to the astonishing problem Italy has in terms of safety in public buildings.

Hospitals

Some hospitals have been evacuated few days ago, as in Cingoli, Matelica, Tolentino, and Norcia. Meanwhile, some patients from some Extended Care Units have been moved to other units. In 2009, in L’Aquila, the San Salvatore hospital, opened since 2000, was severely damaged and patients were evacuated. The same happened in some hospitals in Emilia. This serves to confirm the shameful conditions of the public healthcare system.

Students’ accommodations

Among the others, the historical centre of Camerino has been evacuated. Camerino is a small town of around 7000 people hosting one of the oldest universities in Europe (since 1366), and thousands of students from around Italy. Within the historical centre, most of the students lived in rented apartments, therefore leading to ask how owners prevent harm to students which often move into town with a low/nil perception of risk and sometime have to cope with financial constraints. Questions also arise about whether a public institution such as a university (University of Camerino in this case, but we can easily extend to most of the Italian universities) cares about the quality of the accommodations and the related wellbeing provided for their students, which also largely contribute to the local economy. In this case, we have to remember that one of the students’ accommodations provided by the University of L’Aquila, a post-war multi-floor building so-called Casa dello Studente, collapsed in 2009, and 8 students perished. Again, nothing new in this case.

Schools and university buildings

A damage assessment in the area is ongoing for school buildings, and schools’ operations are suspended. This is a very sensitive issue, as in past earthquakes several schools and university buildings sustained severe damages. Recalling recent episodes, in the Abruzzi region after the L'Aquila earthquake dozens of schools were considered unsafe for occupancy and moved into temporary school shelters called MUSPs (Moduli ad Uso Scolastico Provvisorio), still on the ground and hosting thousands of students. Also the University of L’Aquila buildings were severely damaged and operated for years out of temporary solutions such as industrial hangars. In Emilia and Lombardy regions, in 2012, dozens of schools were severely damaged. In Molise (31^st October 2002, rightly 14 years ago), 28 out of the total 30 victims were in San Giuliano di Puglia (1000 inhabitants), where the rooftop of the primary school collapsed because of the earthquake killing 27 kids and one teacher. Last August, a wing of the primary school in Amatrice collapsed, among the others.

The collapsed school in Amatrice. Source

While some overlaps existing between cultural heritage and public buildings exists in Italy, we should therefore include in our discussions also which kind of public services are provided, and how.

Rejecting the mantra of a generalizable reconstruction model

Some of the aforementioned villages (e.g., Visso, Ussita, Preci, Camerino, Castelsantangelo sul Nera) were already affected by the earthquake in Umbria and Marche regions on September 1997, which left 11 victims and severe damages to important cultural heritage such as the Basilica of San Francis in Assisi, one of the most important sites for catholic religion and pilgrims. Therefore, important questions arise relating to whether these collapsed buildings benefited of reconstruction funds after 1997; who assessed and monitored the reconstruction process; how it has been done; and, therefore, how reconstruction funds allocated to “build back better” were really used.

A serious investigation must eventually reject the toxic narrative of the post-disaster reconstruction in Umbria and Marche (1997) regions as a successful and exportable “model” to be applied in other affected areas. The mantra of a generic -and generalizable- reconstruction model is still in fact a commonly accepted discourse in Italy (but not limited to it). Particularly, after the earthquake in Amatrice, the Prime Minister Matteo Renzi appointed the former President of the Emilia-Romagna Region, Vasco Errani, as Commissario per la Ricostruzione, a sort of Director appointed for managing the reconstruction process. Renzi choose Vasco Errani as he was called for the same appointment after the earthquake in Emilia-Romagna in May 2012. Strong criticisms remain on his outcomes in the region (Pitzalis, 2016), while some (like me) consider this appointment as purely an opportunity to give political office to a party member. Nevertheless, the Italian government justified this appointment, claiming that Errani was successful and effective in managing reconstruction and therefore is the “right man” for exporting the “Emilia reconstruction model” in Amatrice and surrounding areas. However, longstanding evidences from scientific literature report that reconstruction models never find application, and when these models are forcibly implemented in an affected area can contribute to worsen the existing conditions (Lizarralde et al., 2010).

In Italy, the complexity of politics and of governance structures strongly affects the reconstruction process, which therefore depends on a vast range of factors, such as the “political use” of earthquake and reconstruction by central governments (as during the Berlusconi mandate after L’Aquila earthquake, 2009); the role assigned to regional governments (after the earthquakes in Friuli, 1976; Umbria and Marche, 1997; and Emilia, 2012); the relations between central and regional governments (after the earthquakes in Friuli, 1976; and Molise, 2002), between politics and science (again in L’Aquila, see for example Alexander, 2014), and between politics and powerful corrupted elites (as after the Campania and Basilicata earthquake, 1980). It is also worthwhile noting that contextual factors at the local level are decisive in addressing reconstruction and its timeframe, such as the characteristics of the built environment (not just of cultural heritage, but also of post-war and recent buildings); the capacity of the affected communities to claim and enforce their will and rights; the skills, knowledge, and capacities by local institutions (e.g., Mayor and City Councils) in managing emergency, disasters, and related risk reduction. All these variables strictly interact and shape governance, resource management, interactions. All have to be evaluated case by case, Municipality by Municipality, sometime neighbourhood by neighbourhood, and therefore do not allow to generalize the successfulness -or not- of a post-earthquake reconstruction.

Adding something new: an “emerging” problem in prisons’ safety?

An emerging problem is related to prisons and should require immediate attention not just in Italy, and came on my mind after reading this article, unfortunately in Italian. The earthquake severely damaged the prison of Camerino. Detainees were moved to Rome, while three correction officers were injured. This represents a very sensitive issue as it proves how a social system contributes to the creation of individual and collective vulnerabilities, as detainees have not freedom of movement and are constrained into their cells in case of danger or when a hazard occurs. It also represents an institutional vulnerability as the governance structure of the prison system in Italy did not go through deep reflections on how to ensure safety for detainees requiring assistance in case of hazards. This is not the first time, as for example some prisons were evacuated after the earthquake in Emilia. 

Furthermore, a very interesting witness is that of an ex-detainee in Poggioreale, the prison of Naples. He told that during the earthquake in 1980 (still the strongest and costliest earthquake in Southern Europe since 1980, 3000 victims in total, 53 victims in Naples due to a collapsed building), detainees were left into their cells as “trapped mice” while all the panicked guards left the structure. Of course, this occured 36 years ago; however, the issue of seismic risk for prison never emerged in Italy and only recently have some contributions been provided into literature (Gaillard and Navizet, 2012). The problem seems to be that no specific guidelines exist and all is left to the prison director, who has to provide safety measures for personnel and detainees, simultaneously minimizing the flight risk. Therefore, the option of opening cells is often impracticable.

It is certainly worth questioning the usefulness of jail detention for some kinds of crimes. In any case, detainees have the right to know the risks of the place and of the building, and to be put in conditions that keep them safe. Italian prisons have longstanding problems of overcrowding and of lack of basic human rights in terms of healthcare, hygiene, privacy, gender and sex disparities. The context, therefore, already reproduces vulnerability per se, for example in terms of mental health or heat- or vector-related illness. In this way, the issue of seismic risk may appear as naïve; however, it is necessary that a reflection starts now and involves decision-makers, military and civil personnel, and detainees in understanding risks and enacting adequate preparedness measures.

Conclusion

While the earthquake on 26^th October luckily reported just one victim, it confirmed existing problems in the built environment, including the quality of public buildings. It also rejects the existence of a generic reconstruction model to be applied without considering very context-specific and local variables. It may also add a perspective, such as that of addressing the seismic risk reduction as a right of detainees, which have been underrated by now, but should find more space in scientific and public debate. Once again, these issues have to be discussed and stressed in "peace time", and not following the (genuine, but very often rhetorical) emotional mood  on social media or the political propaganda in the aftermath of a disaster. These issues have to be part of our everyday life, and should be improved through the individual and community everyday life, particularly of those which our social system make vulnerable, for a vast range of reasons.   

PS; I have to thank very much those Italian scholars with which I exchange ideas, impressions, and news about disasters and risks in Italy.  

References

Alexander, D. E. (2014). Communicating earthquake risk to the public: the trial of the “L’Aquila Seven”. Natural Hazards, 72(2), 1159-1173.

Gaillard, J. C., & Navizet, F. (2012). Prisons, prisoners and disaster. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 1, 33-43.

Lizarralde, G., Johnson, C., & Davidson, C. (Eds.). (2009). Rebuilding after disasters: From emergency to sustainability. Routledge.

Pitzalis, S., 2016, Politiche del disastro. Poteri e contropoteri nel terremoto emiliano, Ombre Corte.

The earthquake in Central Italy: stereotyped narratives and missing social science

The disaster

According to the Civil Protection Department, the earthquake which occurred in a small hill area in the Latium, Marche, Abruzzi, and Umbria regions on 24^th August caused 290 reported deaths across three municipalities (230 in Amatrice, 11 in Accumoli, 49 in Arquata del Tronto). There are more than 300 injured. 2,500 have lost their homes and evacuated to tent camps. Some people are still missing. The total number of deaths will be close to that of 309 after the L’Aquila-Abruzzi earthquake, de facto representing one of the most severe disasters in Italy after the 1980 earthquake in Campania (the area I am from) and Basilicata regions, which killed more than 3000 people.

The affected area consists of small villages. Amatrice has around 3000 inhabitants, Accumoli 700, Arquata sul Tronto around 1000. The built environment is mainly constituted by cultural heritage buildings, ranging from medieval times to peasant houses of early XX century, scarcely resilient to earthquakes, and in some cases with limited ordinary maintenance. Legislators are conducting an initial investigation on the bureaucratic process by the Amatrice and Accumoli City Councils for the development approval of 115 collapsed buildings (Del Porto and Tonacci, 2016). Some of the buildings in these areas have been used as holiday houses, for example by people from Rome, which is less than two hours away by road. Among the victims, around 50 were from Rome or close areas, as well as Italian and English tourists. Villages in the Apennines Mountains and, more generally, the vast inland and rural Italy, historically suffer from limited development and few job opportunities. This has led to depopulation, abandonment by youth, and a demographic structure that is aging, mirroring the general demographic trends of Italy.  

“You talkin’ me?” (Robert De Niro, Taxi Driver, 1976)

Some of the reports I have read on this earthquake seem to be using a pure hard science approach for analysing the chronic problem of disasters in Italy. For example, Gully (2016) on the IRIN website focuses on cultural heritage conservation in Italy, and claims the sacrosanct necessity for Italy to investment in earthquake-proof retrofitting. However, individuals and families have to also increase their risk awareness and to retrofit their buildings in order to be earthquake proof. In this regard, the same article quotes Michele Calvi, professor of earthquake engineering at IUSS Pavia. Calvi claims that most of the houses in the affected area were owned by the elderly, or were holiday homes, so they had no great motivation for retrofitting, and that it is necessary to create significant incentives for people to update these buildings codes. 

There is nothing wrong with this, of course. What is wrong is the selection of the expert to talk about disasters including statements on local communities. Calvi is in fact a “hard scientist” that de facto projected, promoted, and helped the Berlusconi’s government in 2009 to realize the CASE Project (Calvi and Spaziante, 2009), still now one the most ignominious and widely-criticized post-disaster housing projects worldwide. A project of 19 new settlements spread across L’Aquila, paradoxically built through a superficial top-down approach as a temporary measure in emergency but with permanent purposes (Alexander, 2013). A project which radically altered the land use and the local landscape and spatial organization, with no public services, public transport, social spaces (Calandra, 2012; Forino, 2015), and refused by part of the population (Fois and Forino, 2014). Therefore, it is quite shocking to a reader with some experience of Italian disasters that a scientist like Michele Calvi, who neglected progressive disaster social research through his action in L’Aquila, has been given space to talk about communities in the affected areas. Why does he have to talk to me?

Hey, Italiano: Pizza, spaghetti and mandolin

Another interesting piece is by Hooper (2016) in The Guardian, which reports that

“Italian officialdom reflects the values of society, in particular Italians’ generalised contempt for rules of any kind, and the prevalence of lazy officials and apathetic, or even corrupt, politicians”.

Systematic corruption permeates most of the political and institutional levels in Italy, particularly through the overlap of financial/economic lobbies, mafia, and powerful institutional positions. In the current political setting of Italy, illegal activities are often used as manu longa of legally institutionalized systems, harassing territories through industrial pollution, environmental risk, or private use of natural resource, all with the real blessing -but the apparent opposition- by formal and legal institutions. This, of course, is also reflected in disaster recovery. National and international literature is full of examples of seismic disaster recoveries (but not limited to them) in Italy which have been led by powerful lobbies, intruding into the political setting and conniving in order to raise the reconstruction cost, three, four, ten times, and demanding the required funds to be disbursed (Caporale, 2010). This process has been spammed across decades and has been held just by a fistful of powerful people within the political, industrial, and financial environment, while leaving crumbs to the rest of the community and therefore contributing to exacerbate emigration, unemployment and social injustice. In a sort of perennial post-disaster recovery associated with paternalistic development in Southern Italy, the Italian government is still sending reconstruction funds to e.g. the Belice area (1968 earthquake), to Campania and Basilicata regions (1980) and to Molise region (2002), with limited or nil improvement in terms of labour policies, social welfare or culture (Caporale, 2010).

However, as this blog consistently attempts to highlight since its birth, contemporary global politics is demonstrating that concepts such as “legal”/rules and “illegal” have always more overlaps than differences, with the “legal”/rules using -while blaming- the “illegal” to perpetrate social and spatial inequalities or to find a scapegoat for bypassing public responsibilities. Wars, exploitation, neo-colonialism, racism, asylum-seekers debate, civilization clash propaganda demonstrate this, every day and at each scale and latitude. Italy is therefore perfectly framed within, but also exacerbates, the common and contradictory democratic framework that we observe within the global neoliberal society. No. Italy is not a black sheep within an innocent and virtuous flock made by US, European Union, Australia, or puppet dictators worldwide.

In addition, the aforementioned statement does not consider the other side of disaster recovery history in Italy. The country has seen impressive social mobilization, as born in post-earthquake areas to claim democracy, participation, rights, and law requirements, such as the struggle for work rights and prompt reconstruction in Belice or Campania and Basilicata (Ventura, 2010), the bottom-up reconstruction plans by some affected communities (Forino, 2015), the community resilience initiatives (Fois and Forino, 2014), and the participatory practices (Calandra 2012) in L’Aquila, as well as the grassroots mobilization in Emilia Romagna (Hajek, 2013). Hooper (2016) manages to trivialize, probably because he is not aware of, the bottom up requests for transparency, democracy, and laws, in opposition to the systematic corruption after disasters. Talking about “values of a society” is therefore always problematic, particularly when trying to judge an entire national system and its inhabitants in a wicked event such as a disaster. Values are always individual, although mediated by the context in which these are performed and experienced, and claiming that the values of the Italian society are those of laziness, corruption, and bypassing rules is stereotypical and discriminatory.

A missing social science

These articles are just two among the numerous reports of the earthquake in Italy that have proposed a partial analysis to a complex issue such as a disaster. While hard scientists and professionals such as seismologists, geologists, engineers, architects, planners, economists are necessary figures to assist politics and policy-making in being effective, they have to be supported by, and to mutually support, the analysis of social issues that intervene within a disaster scenario and have contributed to shape disaster literature for the past 80 years. Such analysis includes for example history, development, specific needs within communities of people with disability or children, communication, formal and informal network between citizens and institutions (Ventura and Carnelli, 2015). Scientists and professionals such as anthropologists, sociologists, communication and media experts, geographers, and territorial scientists of any sort are fundamental in adding a human and social perspective to disaster studies and actions, and particularly in deconstructing partial and superficial narratives such as those aforementioned.

UPDATE: on 28th August, this post has been republished with some slight revisions in the blog run by ENTITLE, a European network of research and training on political ecology. I strongly recommend this blog, particularly for readers interested in neoliberalism, development and environment. This is their Facebook page. For Italian readers, an Italian version has been published on 29th August on the Facebook page Protezione civile e riduzione del rischio da disastri, and has been uploaded on my Academia.

References

Alexander, D.E., (2013), An evaluation of the medium-term recovery process after the 6 April 2009 earthquake in L’Aquila, central Italy. Environmental Hazards, 12 (1), 60– 73.

Calandra, L. M. (2012). Territorio e democrazia. Un laboratorio di geografia sociale nel doposisma aquilano. Edizioni L'Una.

Calvi, G. M., Spaziante, V. (2009). La ricostruzione tra provvisorio e definitivo: il Progetto CASE. Progettazione sismica, 3, 227-252.

Caporale, A. (2010). Terremoti spa. Dall'Irpinia all'Aquila. Così i politici sfruttano le disgrazie e dividono il paese. Rizzoli.

Del Porto D., Tonacci, F., 2016, Terremoto, l'accusa del procuratore: “Palazzi con più sabbia che cemento”, http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/08/27/news/terremoto_l_accusa_del_procuratore_palazzi_con_piu_sabbia_che_cemento_-146690386/?ref=HREA-1

Fois, F., Forino, G. (2014). The self‐built ecovillage in L'Aquila, Italy: community resilience as a grassroots response to environmental shock. Disasters, 38(4), 719-739.

Forino, G. (2015). Disaster recovery: narrating the resilience process in the reconstruction of L’Aquila (Italy). Geografisk Tidsskrift-Danish Journal of Geography, 115(1), 1-13.

Gully A., (2016), The problem of medieval villages and earthquakes, http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/08/26/problem-medieval-villages-and-earthquakes?utm_source=IRIN+-+the+inside+story+on+emergencies&utm_campaign=0572bb12bb-RSS_EMAIL_ENGLISH_ALL&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d842d98289-0572bb12bb-15672893

Hajek, A., (2013), Learning from L'Aquila: grassroots mobilization in post-earthquake Emilia-Romagna. Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 18(5), 627-643.

Hooper J., (2016), Italy earthquake throws spotlight on lax construction laws, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/24/italy-earthquake-throws-spotlight-on-lax-construction-laws?CMP=share_btn_fb

Ventura S., (2010), Non sembrava novembre quella sera, Mephite.

Ventura S., Carnelli, F., (eds.), (2015), Oltre il rischio sismico. Valutare, comunicare e decidere oggi, Carocci.

Disaster resilience in L'Aquila (Italy)

On 6^th April 2009, an earthquake hit the Italian city of L’Aquila and definitively compromised its pre-existing social and physical structures. In disaster studies, L’Aquila has represented the litmus of “traditional” top-down and clientelistic practices by Italian government and the strong politicization of post-disaster emergency, reconstruction and recovery. The new sprawling city resulting by institutional strategies ignored the social and spatial peculiarities of L’Aquila and trivialized the centuries-old relations between the historical centre of the city and its surrounding neighbourhoods, with current and long-term consequences for the everyday life of the inhabitants.

Several scholars have explored the multiple and complex dimensions of post-disaster L’Aquila: from psychological consequences to changes in the built environment, from social transformations to urban networks and connectivity issues, from social movements to cultural heritage damages. Recently, I have published two papers aiming to investigate the resilience process enacted by emergent grassroots groups in the reconstruction of L’Aquila. These groups are spontaneous and autonomous, and proposed and enacted own ideas and initiatives in reconstructing the city.

The first paper is co-authored with Francesca Fois; it analyses in-depth the functioning of the EVA ecovillage community in developing its own resilience process and in exploiting the window of opportunity, opened by the earthquake, through sustainable practices of everyday life. The second paper analyses and describes the disaster resilience by some emergent groups in L’Aquila, considered as a shared and bottom-up process, rather than a top-down and paternalistic outcome. The paper asserts the integration of the disaster resilience process into institutional strategies would have more successful targeted the needs of local communities during the reconstruction process. Both papers shed light on a qualitative dimension of resilience, that requires more investigation and debate in literature to clearly depict the social and political context in which disasters and related resilience take place.  

If you are interested in my papers, you can find here the first and here the second, and both on my Academia profile.

Any comment is welcome.