Before starting:
While I was writing today this piece about the Italian earthquake on 26th October, a
new earthquake occurred in the same areas (Preci, Norcia, Ussita, Arquata
del Tronto). Much information is yet to be confirmed. Some important pieces of cultural
heritage, such as the Basilica of San Benedetto in Norcia, have collapsed. Places affected by
the previous earthquakes in August and few days ago have been hit as well. The magnitude has to be confirmed at 6.5-6.6. It seems that some villages are isolated and at least three people have been rescued under collapsed buildings. No reported victims. All to be confirmed and updated in the next hours.
The seismic swarm on 26th October
A seismic swarm occurred on the 26th October in the Valnerina area (Umbria region) and in part of the
Macerata province (Marche region). The list of affected places is long,
including: Visso, Ussita, Camerino, Cingoli, Matelica, Norcia, San Severino
Marche, Tolentino, Castelsantangelo sul Nera. These areas are just a few
kilometres far away from Amatrice, Accumoli and Arquata del Tronto, hit on 24th
August by an earthquake which caused 291 deaths, hundreds of injured
and thousands of evacuees. The environment is similar: settlements with
centuries (in some cases one millennium) of history placed on, or perched upon,
hills and mountains in the astonishing landscapes of Central Apennines. The social
structure is similar, with villages usually host to a few hundred inhabitants with an elderly demography. The loss of centuries of settlements,
history, cultural heritage, and human-environment relationships represents
again an unfathomable loss for Italy and the world.
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| The collapsed Basilica of San Benedetto, Norcia, this morning. Source: Twitter |
While damage has been severe, there was just one
reported victim (a 73 years old man due to heart attack); few were severely injured,
and rescues from collapsed buildings were not necessary. This appears to be because when the first quake of 5.4M occurred, people that were
already worried after the earthquake in August were able to evacuate to safer areas, so they were safe when the strongest swarm of 5.9M
occurred. The earthquake was felt in Rome, where people
left their houses going into the streets; in L’Aquila, which is still recovering (and
will do for decades) from the earthquake in 2009; as well as in Amatrice and
closer areas, where other buildings collapsed. Approximately 4000 people have evacuated, in addition to the other 3500 evacuees after the earthquake on
24th August.
It would appear that the destruction of settlements is a sufficient, but not necessary condition, to draw attention by politics,
media and general audience (but I have to admit, also by scholars). The smell
of victims’ blood is necessary, together with the dust on the face of rescuers awake
for 48 hours (better if helped by some rescuers dogs) in order to bring politicians
in the affected areas doing portraits of themselves while hugging affected people, or press and television doing interviews or filming ruins,
better with a heartbreaking soundtrack on the background. Easily touching our
intimate nature as voyeurs, these kind of story are something widely and rapidly shared. Conversely, a part
of two initial and “emotional” days, politics, media, and press very poorly
covered this October event. Being not at a catastrophic level, it can therefore be
declassified as a routine into Italian life and institutions. However, this
earthquake is important like any other Italian earthquake. It serves to confirm the usual trends, to reject common and established narratives given, and to add
hidden perspectives which are now urgent, as very briefly presented below.
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| A damaged building in Visso (Macerata province), 26th October 2016. Source: RT |
Confirming
the perennial emergency
When a disaster happens
(flood or earthquake, does not matter) in Italy, we should always wonder what
has been done in the past. For example, it is acknowledged that these areas
have a great exposure to seismic hazards. Seismologists recognized that seismic faults are very active in these months, so preparedness is an important phase to be understood. Therefore, efforts should have been done
immediately at least for improving preparedness among communities and
institutions, for updating and sharing (when present) emergency plans, for assessing their usefulness, for improving the collaboration between City Councils and communities and between different levels of government. For the longer term, critical conditions in
terms of buildings and slope stability (there have been some landslides) should
have been monitored, assessed, and solutions implemented. However, it seems we
live in a perennial emergency, whether an earthquake, a flood, or an
induced “waste crisis”. Discussions start just after an emergency, Twitter becomes inundated of hashtags, the news occupy pages
of media and of political talks for two weeks, the “state of emergency” is
proclaimed for years deviating from normal administrative and transparent operations;
then, all sink into oblivion until the next tragedy. Great part of politics and media stopped talking about
Amatrice and other areas after three weeks, leaving those places alone and the
affected communities with lasting physical and social disruption.
New
bottles, old wine: confirming same problems
When an earthquake
happens in Italy, the immediate reaction is to point the finger to the
protection of cultural heritage. In my previous intervention on this blog after
the earthquake in August, I tried to explain why reducing seismic risk is not
just a question of safeguarding cultural heritage, but recalls questions of
political commitment, risk perception, necessity of clearer focus by
institutions, collaboration with local communities, and improvement of the
everyday life of these places with jobs, basic and public services, transport,
environmental protection. In this way, it is time to draw attention to the astonishing
problem Italy has in terms of safety in public buildings.
Hospitals
Some hospitals have been
evacuated few days ago, as in Cingoli, Matelica, Tolentino, and Norcia.
Meanwhile, some patients from some Extended Care Units have been moved to other
units. In 2009, in L’Aquila, the San Salvatore hospital, opened since 2000, was
severely damaged and patients were evacuated. The same happened in some
hospitals in Emilia. This serves to confirm the shameful conditions of the public healthcare system.
Students’ accommodations
Among the others, the
historical centre of Camerino has been evacuated. Camerino is a small town of
around 7000 people hosting one of the oldest universities in Europe (since 1366),
and thousands of students from around Italy. Within the historical centre, most
of the students lived in rented apartments, therefore leading to ask how owners
prevent harm to students which often move into town with a low/nil
perception of risk and sometime have to cope with financial constraints. Questions
also arise about whether a public institution such as a university (University
of Camerino in this case, but we can easily extend to most of the Italian universities)
cares about the quality of the accommodations and the related wellbeing provided
for their students, which also largely contribute to the local economy. In this
case, we have to remember that one of the students’ accommodations provided by
the University of L’Aquila, a post-war multi-floor building so-called Casa dello Studente, collapsed in 2009,
and 8 students perished. Again, nothing new in this case.
Schools
and university buildings
A damage
assessment in the area is ongoing for school buildings, and schools’ operations
are suspended. This is a very sensitive issue, as in past earthquakes several
schools and university buildings sustained severe damages. Recalling recent episodes, in the Abruzzi region after the L'Aquila earthquake dozens of schools were considered unsafe
for occupancy and moved into temporary school shelters called MUSPs (Moduli ad Uso Scolastico Provvisorio), still
on the ground and hosting thousands of students. Also the University of
L’Aquila buildings were severely damaged and operated for years out of temporary
solutions such as industrial hangars. In Emilia and Lombardy regions, in 2012, dozens
of schools were severely damaged. In Molise (31st October 2002, rightly
14 years ago), 28 out of the total 30 victims were in San Giuliano di Puglia (1000
inhabitants), where the rooftop of the primary school collapsed because of the
earthquake killing 27 kids and one teacher. Last August, a wing of the primary
school in Amatrice collapsed, among the others.
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| The collapsed school in Amatrice. Source |
While some overlaps existing between cultural heritage and public buildings exists in Italy, we should therefore include in our discussions also which kind of public services are provided, and how.
Rejecting
the mantra of a generalizable reconstruction model
Some of the aforementioned
villages (e.g., Visso, Ussita, Preci, Camerino, Castelsantangelo sul Nera) were
already affected by the earthquake in Umbria and Marche regions on September
1997, which left 11 victims and severe damages to important cultural heritage
such as the Basilica of San Francis in Assisi, one of the most important sites for catholic
religion and pilgrims. Therefore, important questions arise relating to whether these collapsed buildings benefited of reconstruction funds after 1997; who
assessed and monitored the reconstruction process; how it has been done; and,
therefore, how reconstruction funds allocated to “build back better” were
really used.
A serious investigation must eventually reject the toxic narrative of the post-disaster reconstruction in Umbria and Marche (1997)
regions as a successful and exportable “model” to be applied in other affected
areas. The mantra of a generic -and generalizable- reconstruction model is
still in fact a commonly accepted discourse in Italy (but not limited to it).
Particularly, after the earthquake in Amatrice, the Prime Minister Matteo Renzi
appointed the former President of the Emilia-Romagna Region, Vasco Errani, as Commissario per la Ricostruzione, a sort
of Director appointed for managing the reconstruction process. Renzi choose Vasco
Errani as he was called for the same appointment after the earthquake in
Emilia-Romagna in May 2012. Strong criticisms remain on his outcomes in the
region (Pitzalis, 2016), while some (like me) consider this appointment as purely an opportunity to give political office to a party member. Nevertheless,
the Italian government justified this appointment, claiming that Errani was
successful and effective in managing reconstruction and therefore is the “right
man” for exporting the “Emilia reconstruction model” in Amatrice and surrounding areas.
However, longstanding evidences from scientific literature report that
reconstruction models never find application, and when these models are
forcibly implemented in an affected area can contribute to worsen the existing
conditions (Lizarralde et al., 2010).
In Italy,
the complexity of politics and of governance structures strongly affects the reconstruction
process, which therefore depends on a vast range of factors, such as the
“political use” of earthquake and reconstruction by central governments (as
during the Berlusconi mandate after L’Aquila earthquake, 2009); the role assigned
to regional governments (after the earthquakes in Friuli, 1976; Umbria and Marche,
1997; and Emilia, 2012); the relations between central and regional governments
(after the earthquakes in Friuli, 1976; and Molise, 2002), between politics and
science (again in L’Aquila, see for example Alexander, 2014), and between politics and powerful corrupted elites
(as after the Campania and Basilicata earthquake, 1980). It is also worthwhile
noting that contextual factors at the local level are decisive in addressing
reconstruction and its timeframe, such as the characteristics of the built
environment (not just of cultural heritage, but also of post-war and recent
buildings); the capacity of the affected communities to claim and enforce their
will and rights; the skills, knowledge, and capacities by local institutions (e.g.,
Mayor and City Councils) in managing emergency, disasters, and related risk
reduction. All these variables strictly interact and shape governance, resource
management, interactions. All have to be evaluated case by case, Municipality
by Municipality, sometime neighbourhood by neighbourhood, and therefore do not
allow to generalize the successfulness -or not- of a post-earthquake
reconstruction.
Adding
something new: an “emerging” problem in prisons’ safety?
An emerging problem is
related to prisons and should require immediate attention not just in Italy,
and came on my mind after reading this article, unfortunately in Italian. The
earthquake severely damaged the prison of Camerino. Detainees were
moved to Rome, while three correction officers were injured. This represents a
very sensitive issue as it proves how a social system contributes to the creation of individual
and collective vulnerabilities, as detainees have not freedom of movement and are
constrained into their cells in case of danger or when a hazard occurs. It also
represents an institutional vulnerability as the governance structure of the prison
system in Italy did not go through deep reflections on how to ensure safety for detainees
requiring assistance in case of hazards. This is not the first time, as for
example some prisons were evacuated after the earthquake in Emilia.
Furthermore,
a very interesting witness is that of an ex-detainee in Poggioreale, the prison
of Naples. He told that during the earthquake in 1980 (still the strongest and
costliest earthquake in Southern Europe since 1980, 3000 victims in total, 53 victims
in Naples due to a collapsed building), detainees were left into their cells as
“trapped mice” while all the panicked guards left the structure. Of course, this occured 36 years ago; however, the issue of seismic risk for prison
never emerged in Italy and only recently have some contributions been provided into
literature (Gaillard and Navizet, 2012). The problem seems to be that no specific guidelines exist
and all is left to the prison director, who has to provide safety
measures for personnel and detainees, simultaneously minimizing the flight risk.
Therefore, the option of opening cells is often impracticable.
It is certainly worth questioning the usefulness of jail detention for some kinds of crimes. In any case, detainees
have the right to know the risks of the place and of the building, and to be
put in conditions that keep them safe. Italian prisons have
longstanding problems of overcrowding and of lack of basic human rights in
terms of healthcare, hygiene, privacy, gender and sex disparities. The context, therefore, already reproduces vulnerability per se, for example in terms of mental health or heat- or
vector-related illness. In this way, the issue of seismic risk may appear as
naïve; however, it is necessary that a reflection starts now and involves decision-makers,
military and civil personnel, and detainees in understanding risks and enacting adequate preparedness measures.
Conclusion
While the earthquake on
26th October luckily reported just one victim, it confirmed existing
problems in the built environment, including the quality of public buildings. It also rejects
the existence of a generic reconstruction model to be applied without
considering very context-specific and local variables. It may also add a perspective, such as that of addressing the seismic risk reduction as a right of detainees, which have been underrated by now, but should find more space in scientific and
public debate. Once again, these issues have to be discussed and stressed in "peace time", and not following the (genuine, but very often rhetorical) emotional mood on social media or the political propaganda in the aftermath of a disaster. These issues have to be part of our everyday life, and should be improved through the individual and community everyday life, particularly of those which our social system make vulnerable, for a vast range of reasons.
PS; I have to thank very much those Italian scholars with which I exchange ideas, impressions, and news about disasters and risks in Italy.
References
Alexander, D. E. (2014). Communicating earthquake risk to the public: the trial of the “L’Aquila Seven”. Natural Hazards, 72(2), 1159-1173.
Gaillard, J. C., & Navizet, F. (2012). Prisons, prisoners and disaster.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 1, 33-43.
Lizarralde, G., Johnson, C., & Davidson, C. (Eds.). (2009).
Rebuilding after disasters: From emergency to sustainability. Routledge.
Pitzalis, S., 2016, Politiche del disastro. Poteri e contropoteri nel terremoto emiliano, Ombre Corte.
